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I. INTRODUCTION
Following the burst of the Internet bubble, securities
industry participants and observers have focused on "buy"

" Visiting Professor of Law a t Pace University School of Law and CoDirector of its Securities Arbitration Clinic. The author would like to
express her deep gratitude to Professor Barbara Black, Founder and CoDirector of the Clinic, for her editing suggestions, insightful comments,
and all-around encouragement.
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recommendations' made by purportedly independent
research analysts2to the investing public for technology and
Internet stocks. Questions have been raised as to how all of
those analysts could have been so wrong in their
recommendations. Subsequently, their motivations and
methods have been scr~tinized.~
Critics have focused on the
apparent conflict of interest certain analysts faced: they
recommended the purchase of securities t o the investing
public and to customers of their own firms without disclosing
the fact that they owned those very securities, that their
compensation was tied t o their recommendations, or, even
more significantly, that their firms received compensation -typically in the form of investment banking business -- from
the i ~ s u e r . ~
In light of the media attention and public criticism
lavished on brokerage firms' analysts and their undisclosed
conflicts of interest, the industry has implemented many

Analyst recommendations typically fall into three categories: buy,
holdlneutral, or sell. See Securities and Exchange Commission, Analyzing
Analyst
Recommendations,
[hereinafter
Analyzing
Analyst
(last
Recommendations], a t http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/a~lysts.html
modified June 20,2002).
2
Securities research analysts "study publicly traded companies and
make buy and sell recommendations on the securities of those companies.
Most specialize in a particular industry or sector of the economy." Id.
See, e.g., Geraldine Fabrikant & Simon Romero, When Wall Street
Mar. 11, 2002, a t C1 (reporting on firm's
Advice Turns Costly, N.Y. TIMES,
analyst's recommendation of securities of issuer, with which the f h n had
lucrative investment banking relationship); Gretchen Morgenson,
Telecom's Pied Piper: Whose Side Was He On?, N.Y. TIMES,Nov. 18, 2001,
$ 3 , a t 1(criticizing reputable telecommunications analyst who maintained
buy recommendations on companies a s he reportedly helped his securities
firm collect lucrative investment banking fees from the issuers); Scott
Thurm, When Do Analysts Cover Their Own Interests?, WALL
ST. J., Dec.
10, 2001, a t C1 (reporting on one analyst who recommended purchases of
companies without disclosing his ownership interests).
Reflecting the level of public condemnation directed towards
analysts a s the scapegoat for the investment excesses of the Internet
bubble, even the daily comic strip "Dilbert" featured a series of strips
mocking analysts for recommending stocks they owned. Dilbert Daily
Comic Strips, Oct. 15, 16, 17, 2001.
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changes. Many financial services firms have altered their
company policy precluding or limiting the ownership by
analysts of stocks they follow5 and securities self-regulatory
organizations ("SROs") have enacted rules requiring
heightened disclosure of any potential conflicts of interesk6
Most significantly, regulators have begun enforcement
investigations and proceedings? As one striking example of
sweeping regulatory action, on April 8, 2002, New York
State's Attorney General brought an enforcement action in
state court under New York's state securities statute, the
Martin Act: seeking a preliminary injunction directing
Merrill Lynch and some of its research analysts to refrain
from misleading disclosures in their research reports and
seekingjudicial intervention in the continuing inve~tigation.~
The &davit that the Attorney General filed in support of
that application for relief was replete with egregious
examples of conflicts faced by Merrill Lynch analysts --

For example, in August 2001, the Goldman Sachs Group took the
first step of insisting that its research analysts disclose any ownership
interests in companies they follow. See Analysts Told to Reveal Stakes,
N.Y. TIMES,Aug. 9, 2001, a t C4. Just six months later, the firm took the
additional steps of banning all of its analysts from owning stocks in sectors
they cover and separating its research department from the investmentbanking division. See Patrick McGeehan, Goldman Sachs Moves to
Tighten Stock Analysts' Independence, N.Y. TIMES,Feb. 20, 2002, a t C15;
see also Charles Gasparino & Jeff D. Opdyke, Merrill Alters a Policy on
ST. J., July 11, 2001, a t C1 (reporting on new policy
Analysts, WALL
adopted by Merrill Lynch & Co. barring its analysts from buying stock in
companies they cover).
"ee
infra notes 51-68 and accompanying text.
SEC Press Release, SEC Launches Inquiry Into Research Analyst
(Apr.
Conflicts, available a t http~/~~~m~.sec.gov/news/press/2002-56html
25, 2002); Patrick McGeehan, U.S. and State Regulators Join Inquiry on
Apr. 24, 2002, a t C10 (reporting that the
Analysts, N.Y. TIMES,
Department of Justice and state securities regulators would begin
investigating analysts).
N.Y. GEN.BUS.LAW$5 352 et seq. (2002).
Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot
Spitzer, Merrill Lynch Stock Rating System Found Biased by Undisclosed
Conflicts of Interest, available a t http://mv.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002
/apr/a.pr08b-02.html (Apr. 8,2002).
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including the allegation that the analysts themselves had
different opinions of the issuers than those disseminated
publicly in their supposedly independent research reports.1°
The Supreme Court of New York granted the requested relief
and, pending completion of the Attorney General's
investigation, issued an order temporarily restraining the
respondents from violating the Martin Act and specifically
from preparing or disseminating any research report on an
issuer without disclosing Merrill Lynch's investment
banking relationships with that issuer." Not long after,
Merrill Lynch settled with the Attorney General before it
even filed formal charges -- agreeing to pay a $100 million
penalty and t o restructure its research department to
insulate analysts from many of these conflicts.12
Outside of the regulatory landscape, investors
increasingly have brought lawsuits and arbitrations against
analysts for damages resulting from recommendations
tainted by conflicts of interest.13 For example, in July 2001,

Affidavit of Eric Dinallo in Support of Application for an Order
Pursuant to General Business Law 3 354 [hereinafter Dinallo M.1,
available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002~aprerrillL.pdf(Apr.
8,2002). If true, the evidence described in the Dinallo ffidavit provides a
strong evidentiary basis to suggest the analysts recklessly or even
intentionally defrauded investors.
l1 Order Pursuant to General Business Law Section 354, In the
Matter of An Enquiry By Eliot Spitzer, Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co., Index No. 02401522, available at http://~v.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/apr/apr08b~O2.
html (Apr. 8,2002).
l2 See Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot
Spitzer, Spitzer, Merrill Lynch Reach Unprecedented Agreement to
Reform Investment Practices, available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us
/press/2002/may/may2la~02.html
(May 21,2002).
13
See, e.g., Jeff D. Opdyke & Susanne Craig, Hunt Family Members
Win Case Against Goldman, WALLST. J., Aug. 10,2001, a t B2. In the case
reported in the article, a securities arbitration panel awarded about
$400,000 to a n investor against Goldman Sachs for losses in securities
whose issuer was covered by a Goldman analyst who failed to disclose his
conflicts of interest in the recommended security. However, because the
award did not include an opinion (as arbitration awards typically do not),
the reasoning of the arbitrators remains unknown. See In re Arbitration
lo
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Merrill Lynch settled an arbitration proceeding brought by a
former customer before an arbitration panel of the New York
Stock Exchange. Merrill Lynch agreed to pay $400,000 to
the customer who alleged that he was misled by a favorable
research report issued by Merrill Lynch technology-stock
analyst, Henry Blodget (the analyst whose e-mails played a
significant role in the New York State Attorney General's
investigation), on a company whose securities the customer
purchased. Both the customer's broker and Merri11 Lynch's
report failed to disclose that Merrill Lynch had an
investment banking relationship with the issuer.14 Due to
the settlement, however, the legal theory underlying the
claimant's case against Merrill Lynch and Blodget has not
been tested.
Securities research analysts provide securities
recommendations for institutional and individual investors,
and hold themselves out as providers of independent
objective analyses of issuers. Analysts generally divide
themselves into three types: "sell-side," "buy-side," or
independent. Sell-side analysts are those analysts who work
for large brokerage firms with brokerage customers.15 The
brokers use the research to recommend and sell securities to
their customers. These firms also typically have investment
banking divisions that underwrite securities, and the
investment banks use the analyst research t o serve an
important due diligence function for the undenvriters.16 In
contrast, buy-side analysts "typically work for institutional
money managers -- such as mutual funds, hedge funds, or

Between Stuart Hunt, et al. v. Goldman, Sachs and Co., Docket No. 0000249,2001 WL 1008474 (N.A.S.D. Aug. 8,2001).
l4 See Charles Gasparino, Merrill is Paying in Wake of Analyst's Call
on Tech Stock, WALLST. J., July 20,2001, a t C1.
l5 Analyzing Analyst Recommendations, supra note 1,a t 1.
l6 Id. a t 2; see also Testimony of Robert R. Glauber, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer, National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.,
Before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Hearing on
Analyst Independence [hereinafter Glauber Testimony], available at
http://~mm.nasd.comlnewdsp/ppl~28.html
(Feb. 27,2002).
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investment advisers."17 Buy-side analysts work for firms
that manage portfolios of others and make investment
decisions directly on their behalf.ls Finally, independent
analysts are not affiliated with either the sell-side or the
buy-side and "sell their research reports on a subscription or
other basis."lg
Analysts' conflicts of interest are troubling to investors,
who rely on the integrity of these industry professionals.
Under the shingle theory,20broker-dealers, including their
sell-side analyst employees, have a duty to deal fairly with
their customers. This duty of fair dealing encompasses the
duty to give customers their undivided loyalty.21 If an
analyst serves two competing masters -- his firm's customers
t o whom he recommends the purchase of a security, on the
one hand, and the investment banking department of the
firm, which stands to lose lucrative investment banking fees
from an issuer if the firm does not maintain a "buy"
recommendation on the issuer's stock, on the other hand,
then the analyst has violated this duty of loyalty.22 By
failing to disclose these divided loyalties in research reports,
analysts have deceived the customers who rely on these
reports to reflect an unbiased, objective analysis of the
strengths, weaknesses, and market value of the securities.
However, there appears to be scant precedent supporting
an investor's right to civil damages for undisclosed conflicts
of interest by analysts. The federal securities laws, as
currently interpreted by the Supreme Court, do not clearly

17

Analyzing Analyst Recommendations, supra note 1, a t 2.
Id. a t 1.
l9 Id.
20 The shingle theory of liability of broker-dealers to their customers
"presume[sl that a broker-dealer that hangs out a shingle and solicits
customers makes an implied representation of fair dealing." Roberta S.
Karmel, Is the Shingle Theory Dead?, 52 WASH.& LEEL. REV. 1271, 1271
(1995).
21 NORMANS. POSER,BROKER-DEALER
LAW AND REGULATION§
2.03[A1[21 (3d ed. 2002).
22
For a discussion of the variety of conflicts of interest that currently
exist in the securities industry, see id. a t 9 1.02.
l8
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provide investors with a right of action against a brokerdealer or its employees merely for a breach of their
professional duties.23 Indeed, numerous scholars have
questioned the validity of the shingle theory as a basis for
imposing federal securities fraud liability.24 Furthermore,
enhanced industry regulation does not necessarily translate
into additional private rights of action for the investing
public.
Historically, the courts have imposed liability on industry
participants for failure t o disclose their intent to trade on the
short-term market effect of their recommendations -- a
practice known as "s~alping."~~
However, beyond scalping,
what legal duties do analysts have to customers to disclose
their conflicts of interest in the securities they recommend?
Part I1 of this article addresses recent regulatory efforts
t o proscribe undisclosed conflicts of interest beyond mere
scalping, including ownership interests in recommended
securities, and the compensation connection between
analysts and investment bankers within a firm. Part I11 of
this article traces the history of prior cases imposing liability
on industry participants, including investment advisers,
analysts and others, for failing to disclose their conflicts of
interest when recommending securities. Part IV of this
article then examines the question of whether analysts have
any civil liability t o those relying on their recommendations
for failure to disclose actual or potential conflicts of interest.
Finally, the author concludes that, in light of the new
regulations, analysts should be liable t o investors for their
undisclosed conflicts of interest.

" Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up As They Go Along: The
Role of Law in Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOZOL. REV.991, 1006-07
(2002).
24 See Karmel, supra note 20, at 1272.
25 See infra notes 69-86 and accompanying text.
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11. REGULATORY EFFORTS TO LIMIT
UNDISCLOSED ANALYST CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST

A. Existing Regulation
Even before the recent criticism of analysts, regulations
did mandate certain disclosures by industry participants -including analysts -- involving potential conflicts of interest.
First, section 17(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 ("SA)26
precludes any person, including any analyst, from receiving
undisclosed compensation for making a securities
reco~nmendation.~~
Second, the Investment Advisers Act
("IAA")28regulates those who provide investment advice,
including buy-side analysts.29 However, the IAA does not
provide a private right of action t o investors,3O and none of
these regulations target sell-side analysts.

15 U.S.C. 8 77q(b) (2000).
This section explicitly prohibits publishing an investment
newsletter or article containing a description of a security without
disclosing any compensation received or to be received from the issuer. Id.
However, most courts addressing this issue do not imply a private right of
action under section 17(b). See, e.g., Ostler v. Codman Research Group,
Inc., 1999 WL 1059684, a t *4 (D.N.H. Apr. 20, 1999); Sowell v. Butcher &
Singer, Inc., 1987 WL 10712, a t *3 (E.D. Pa. May 13,1987).
28 15 U.S.C. 5 8Ob-1 et seq. (2000).
29 15 U.S.C. 5 80b-6 (2000). This section precludes advisers, including
buy-side analysts, from "employ[ing] any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud any client or prospective client"; "engag[ing] in any transaction,
practice or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any
client"; "acting as principal for his own account" without disclosure; and
"engag[ing] in any act, practice or course of business which is fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative." While the statute does not expressly require
disclosure of buy-side analysts' conflicts of interests, the Supreme Court
has construed this section to cover scalping. See infra notes 69-86 and
accompanying text.
30 Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19-20
(1979). The IAA does permit investors to sue for the limited relief of
rescission of an investment advisory agreement and return of advisory fees
paid. See 15 U.S.C. 5 80b-15 (2000).
26
27
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The National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD")
closes this regulatory gap.31 Because most sell-side research
analysts work for broker-dealers that must register with the
NASD, they are deemed "associated persons"32 of their
registered broker-dealer firms and thus are covered by
NASD rules of conduct.33 Until recently, one NASD Conduct
Rule mandated disclosure of only certain limited conflicts of
interest by members in any advertisements and sales
literature (including research report^)?^ NASD Rule 2210,
Communications with the Public, requires that members
disclose in research reports that, among other things, the
member firm makes a market in the recommended security,
the member or its officers or partners own options, rights or
warrants to purchase the recommended security, and the
member managed or co-managed any public offering of the
~
recommended security within the last three ~ e a r s . 3 This
regulation applies t o analysts' public recommendations
broadly disseminated to the public, where analysts are not in
a fiduciary relationship with investors and the precise
nature of their obligations to the public is less clear than in
the individual context of the broker-customer relati~nship.~~
Significantly, this rule does not require that the member
or analyst disclose any ownership interest in a recommended
security. Thus, until very recently, there were no rules
The National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. is an SRO
established pursuant to 15 U.S.C. $780-3(a), that creates rules to regulate
the conduct of its members, which include almost all securities firms in
the United States. The NASD is the world's largest securities SRO.
NASD Regulation, Inc. enforces these rules.
' The Securities Exchange Act defines "associated persons" and
includes any employee of a broker-dealer. See 15 U.S.C. $78(c)(18) (2000).
Associated persons must register with the SEC. 15 U.S.C. $ 780 (2000).
Article V of the By-Laws of the NASD similarly requires associated
persons of NASD member firms to register with the NASD. By-Laws of
the NASD, Art. V(l), NASD Manual (CCH) 2002.
a See Glauber Testimony, supra note 16.
NASD Conduct Rules, Rule 2210(d)(2),NASD Manual (CCH) 2002.
Id.
36 See THO~IAS
LEE HAZEN,LAW OF SECURITIES
REGULATION14.16[6]
(2002).
31
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prohibiting buy-side or sell-side analysts from owning stock
in the companies they cover, or rules controlling their
relationship with the investment bankers in their own firms
that may underwrite the companies they cover. It is
precisely this loophole that garnered so much attention.

B. Recent Regulatory Efforts
On July 31, 2001, Laura Unger, the then acting
Chairwoman of the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC"), testified before Congress regarding the conflicts of
interest that research analysts face.37 She identified for the
House Financial Services Subcommittee the sources of these
llacutel'conflicts:
First, an analyst's salary and bonus may be linked to
the profitability of the firm's investment banking
business, motivating analysts to attract and retain
investment banking clients for the firm. Second, at
some firms, analysts are accountable t o investment
banking for their ratings. Third, analysts sometimes
own a piece of the company they analyze, mostly
through pre-IPO share acquisition^.^^

37

Laura S. Unger, Testimony Concerning Conflicts of Interest Faced
by Brokerage Firms and Their Research Analysts, Before the
Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored
Enterprises, Committee on Financial Services, United States House of
at
Representatives
[hereinafter Unger Testimony], available
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/073101oslu.htm (July 31, 2001).
Commissioner Unger also simultaneously submitted similar written
testimony to Congress. See Laura S. Unger, Written Testimony
Concerning Conflicts of Interest Faced by Brokerage Firms and Their
ekea arch Analysts, Before the Subcommittee on Capital Markets,
Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises, Committee on
Financial Services, United States House of Representatives [hereinafter
Unger Written Testimony], available at http://mmv.sec.gov/news/
testimony/073101tslu.html. (July 31,2001).
38
See Unger Testimony, supra note 37. Analysts' equity stakes in the
positions they cover may also derive from direct stock purchases or
participation in employee stock purchase pools. See Unger Written
Testimony, supra note 37.
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In making these observations of industry practices
suggesting troubling conflicts of interest, Unger relied on
evidence gathered by SEC staff that conducted on-site
inspections of firms.39 These inspections revealed that
research analysts routinely: (1)consulted with investment
bankers at their firms regarding issuers the analysts
covered, (2) covered companies that their firms underwrote,
(3) provided investment bankers with advance notice of their
changes in recommendations, and (4) issued "booster-shot
research reports" right around the time a lock-up period
expired (during which time the firm's associated persons
may be restricted from selling).40Unger also noted the more
obvious problems of analysts owning stakes in companies
they followed and the fact that positive research reports can
"trigger higher trading volumes, resulting in higher
commissions for the firms."41 The inspections also revealed
that firm policies with respect to proscribing these practices
varied greatly, that existing regulations did not prohibit
many of these practices, and that compliance with the few
existing regulations which do limit some of these practices
was minimal, at least at some
Commissioner Unger then highlighted several steps that
the regulators and the industry had taken recently to
improve the objectivity and independence of research
analysts, including firm-wide review of internal policies and
procedures and enhanced SRO r e g ~ l a t i o n . ~ She
~
also
emphasized the importance of investor education, and the
SEC's role in educating investors to the potential conflicts
analysts face.44 She concluded by urging continued
39

Unger Written Testimony, supra note 37.
Unger Testimony, supra note 37.
Unger Written Testimony, supra note 37.
42 Id.
43 Unger Testimony, supra note 37.
44 Id.
Commissioner Unger noted that the SEC's Office of Investor
Education and Assistance published on its website an investor alert issued
the previous month to explain to the public investor the role of the
research analyst in order to help the investor identify potential conflicts of
interest faced by analysts in issuing their recommendations, and to advise
40
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examination of these conflicts and additional regulation to
"minimize and manage" these conflicts.45
In response to the public's focus on analyst conflicts, the
NASD proposed strengthening its rules t o regulate analyst
disclosures. In July 2001, NASD Regulation ("NASDR")
requested that the public comment on proposed amendments
to NASD Rule 2210.46 The amendments were designed to
enhance disclosure requirements imposed by the NASD on
research that analysts in their securities recommendations
made either in written research reports or during public
appearances (TV,radio, on-line chats, etc.). NASDR stated
that the "proposal represents a first step to address issues
related t o the quality and independence of research
recommendations issued by firms and associated persons."47
The proposed amended rule would have required analysts
t o disclose: (1) any financial interest they have in a
recommended security, (2) "if the member firm owns five
percent or more of the total outstanding shares of any class
of securities of the recommended issuer," and (3) that the
"member has received compensation from the recommended
issuer for any investment banking services provided t o the
issuer within the last 12 months." The amended rule also
would have required that any written disclosures be made
"specifically and pr~minently."~~
In February 2002, the NASD superseded the July 2001
proposal with a new, more comprehensive proposed rule
change t o amend NASD rules to address many of the
practices identified by Commissioner Unger. Pursuant to

investors how to protect themselves.
Recommendations, supra note 1, a t 1.
45 Unger Testimony, supra note 37.

Analyzing

Analyst

46 See Required Disclosures for Securities Recommendations, NASD
Notice to Members 01-45 -- Request for Comment (July 2001).
41 Id. a t 1.
48 Id. a t 3. The NASDR writes that "[tlhis language is intended to
prohibit the use of boilerplate in footnotes and other inconspicuous
locations in advertisements and sales literature, so that investors can
more readily ascertain the existence and degree of any potential conflicts
of interest." Id.
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section 19(b)(l) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
("SEA")49and SEC Rule 19b-4,50the NASD filed with the
SEC a proposal t o establish NASD Rule 2711, "Research
Analysts and Research Reports," t o address analyst conflicts
of interesL51 Additionally, on February 27, 2002, the NYSE
filed with the SEC a proposal similar to that of the NASD,
seeking to amend NYSE Rule 472, "Communications with
the Public," t o regulate stock exchange members and its
associated persons (including analysts), with respect to
minimizing andlor disclosing analyst conflicts of intere~t.5~
On March 8, 2002, the SEC filed the NASD and NYSE
proposals in the Federal Register, seeking public comment
on the text of the amended
Following a period of
public comment, and the filing of additional minor
amendments, on May 8, 2002, the SEC approved these
proposed rule changes.54 As approved, NASD Rule 2711
prohibits:
15 U.S.C. 5$78sCb)(l)(2000).
60 17 C.F.R. 5 240.1933-4 (2002).
Form 19b-4, Proposed Rule Change to Establish Rule 2711,
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., available at
http:ll~mm~.nasdr.com/pdf-text/fl2~2l-analyst.pdf(Feb.
8,2002).
'* Form 19b-4, Proposed Rule Change by New York Stock Exchange,
(Feb. 26,2002).
Inc., available at http://mm.nyse.com/pdf~/2002-09fi1.pdf
63 NASD and NYSE Rulemaking: Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule
Changes by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. and the
New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to Research Analyst Conflicts of
Interest, Exchange Act Release No. 45,526, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,526 (Mar. 14,
2002). The SEC filing also reported that, on March 7, 2002, the NASD
submitted an amendment to its proposed rule change which clarified the
impact of proposed Rule 2711 on existing Rule 2210, and conformed
certain required disclosures to the NYSE proposal. Id. a t n. 3.
SEC Press Release, Commission Approves Rules to Address Analyst
Conflicts, S.E.C. Also Requires EDGAR Filings by Foreign Issuers,
available at http:llm.sec.gov/newslpress/2002-63 (May 8, 2002); see
also NASD and NYSE Rulemaking: Self-Regulatory Organizations; Order
Approving Proposed Rule Changes by the National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. and the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and Notice
of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of Amendment No. 2
to the Proposed Rule Change by the National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc. and Amendment No. 1to the Proposed Rule Change by the
49
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the investment banking department of a firm from
supervising or controlling analysts;55
employees of the investment banking department
from reviewing or approving a research report in
advance of p ~ b l i c a t i o n ; ~ ~
members from submitting a research report to the
issuer for its review before p ~ b l i c a t i o n ; ~ ~
members from tying analyst compensation to specific
investment banking transaction^;^'
members from promising favorable research to an
issuer in exchange for business or compen~ation;~~
underwriters from issuing research reports on a
company during a certain "quiet period" following an
initial public or secondary ~ffering;~'
analysts and their household members from buying
or receiving an issuer's securities prior to an offering;

New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to Research Analyst Conflicts of
Interest, Exchange Act Release No. 34-45,908 (May 10,2002).
55 As approved, NASD Rule 2711 and its commentary is available a t
http~/www.nasdr.comIpdf-text/0239/ntm.t
(Oct. 20,2002).
56 NASD Rule 2711(b)(2)-(3).
The rule makes a n exception for
investment banking review -- via the compliance or legal department -- for
the purpose of verifying the factual accuracy of information or screening
for any potential conflict of interest.
57 NASD Rule 2711(c)(l)-(2). The rule makes an exception for review,
under limited circumstances, by the issuer to verify the factual accuracy of
company information.
NASD Rule 2711(d).
59 NASD Rule 2711(e).
60 NASD Rule 2711(f)(l)-(2). The "quiet period" is forty days following
an initial public offering and ten days following a secondary offering. This
provision is intended to "reduce a manager's ability to improperly reward
the subject company for its underwriting business by publishing favorable
research after completion of the offering." Form 19b-4, supra note 51.

Heinonline - - 2002 Colum. Bus. L . Rev. 644 2002

No. 3:63 11

ANALYSTS' UNDISCLOSED CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

645

if the company is principally engaged in the same
type of business covered by the analysG61
analysts and their household members from trading
securities in companies they cover either 30 days
before or 5 days after the issuance of a research
report;62
analysts and their household members from trading
against their current recommendation^;^^
members from issuing research reports or an analyst
from making public appearances without disclosing
the analyst's financial interest in the recommended
company or the member's beneficial ownership of 1%
or more of common stock of the company, or of any
other known conflicts of interest of the member or
the analyst;64
members from issuing research reports or an analyst
from making public appearances without disclosing
additional information suggesting a conflict of
interest, such as compensation received from the
covered company, any officer or director position held
by the analyst in the company, and whether the firm
makes a market in the covered ~ e c u r i t i e sand
;~~
members from issuing research reports without
disclosing certain information about the analyst's
rating, including the meaning of its ratings, the

NASD Rule 2711(g)(l).
a NASD Rule 2711(g)(2)(A)-(B). The rule does not cover such trading
when an analyst seeks to sell all of his securities held in a company a t the
inception of coverage or following a significant news event concerning the
subject company.
" NASD Rule 2711(g)(3)-(4). The rule does permit such trading in
limited circumstances, such a s personal financial needs of the beneficial
owner of the research analyst account.
NASD Rule 2711(h)(l)-(10). All disclosures required by subsection
(h)must be "clear, comprehensive and prominent."
a NASD Rule 2711(h)(2), (3)-(8).
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distribution of its ratings, and valuation methods
used to determine any price target.6"

Finally, the rule requires each member to adopt and
implement supervisory procedures designed to ensure
compliance with proposed Rule 2711.67

111. C M L LIABILITY OF SECURITIES INDUSTRY
PARTICIPANTS FOR UNDISCLOSED CONFLICTS
OF INTEREST
Now that these new rules are effective, the question
arises as to whether any violation of them would give rise to
civil liability for securities fraud under the federal securities
laws to an investor who purchased a security based on the
An examination of the judicial
analyst's rec~mmendation.~~
development of liability for a more egregious undisclosed
conflict of interest -- scalping -- can help answer this
question.

NASD Rule 2711(h)(4)-(9). The rule also provides a "catch-all" to
cover any disclosures already required by any applicable rule or
regulation.
67 NASD Rule 2711(i).
Simultaneous with the publication of these
proposed rule changes, the NASD launched a n investor education
initiative designed "to educate investors about research reports, their
value and their limitations." Press Release, NASD Launches Analyst
Disclosure
Investor
Education
Initiative,
available
at
http://www.nasdr.com/news/pr2002/releaseO2Ol0.html (Feb. 12, 2002).
As part of this initiative, the NASD published a "Guide to Understanding
Securities Analyst Recommendations" and a "Glossary of Analyst
Research Terms," both available a t http://www.nasdr.com.
68 Implicit in this question is the assumption that the new analyst
rules do not provide for a private cause of action. While it is wellestablished that a violation of SRO rules does not give rise to a private
right of action (see, e.g., In re VeriFone Sec. Litig., 11 F.3d 865, 870 (9th
Cir. 1993); Craighead v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 899 F.2d 485, 493 (6th Cir.
1990)), a t least one court has refused to vacate an arbitration award based
on a n SRO rule violation, concluding that the well-settled law precluding
private lawsuits in courts for SRO rule violations does not preclude an
award to a customer suing in arbitration for damages solely based on SRO
rule violations. See Freeman v. Arahill, Index No. 111119/01 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
N.Y.County Oct. 18,2001).
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A. Liability Under the Investment Advisers Act
In 1963, the Supreme Court first addressed the practice
of scalping -- defined as, at least with respect to a registered
investment adviser, the "practice of purchasing shares of a
security for his own account shortly before recommending
that security for long-term investment and then immediately
selling the shares at a profit upon the rise in the market
price following the recommendation."" In Capital Gains, the
SEC brought an enforcement action against a registered
investment advisor and his investment advisory firm,
claiming that defendants' scalping activities violated section
206(2) of the IAA70 At a preliminary injunction hearing in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York, the SEC established that defendants, on six
different occasions in an eight-month time period, purchased
shares of a security "shortly" before a monthly report
published by their investment advisory service recommended
it for long-term i n ~ e s t m e n t .On
~ ~ each occasion, the market
price and trading volume of the recommended security rose
within a few days after the service distributed the rep0rt.7~
Defendants "immediately thereafter" sold their shares of the
securities at a profitY3without disclosing "any aspect of these
transactions to their clients or prospective clients."74

69 SEC V. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 181
(1963).
15 U.S.C. $gob-6(2)(2000). This section prohibits any "transaction,
practice or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any
client or prospective client."
375 U.S. at 182-83. In the Second Circuit's opinion affirming the
denial of the injunction by the district court, the court of appeals reported
that each of defendants' purchases were made three to seven days in
advance of the recommendation. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
Inc., 300 F.2d 745, 747-48 (2d Cir. 19611, afld on reh'g en bane, 306 F.2d
606 (2d Cir. 1962),rev'd, 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
7Z 375 U.S. at 183.
73 Id. Defendants sold their stock within one or two weeks following
the recommendation. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 300 F.2d a t
747-48.
74 375 U.S. a t 183.
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In denying the injunction application, the district court
narrowly construed the terms "fraud" and "deceit" in section
206(2) and found that, absent proof that defendants intended
t o defraud their clients or that defendants injured their
clients, the SEC could not establish a violation of the IAA.75
The SEC appealed. On appeal, the Second Circuit, sitting en
banc, affirmed the denial of injunctive relief.76The court of
appeals ruled that a violation of the Act necessarily required
a showing of intentional fraud, such as, inter alia, proof that
defendants made the recommendations with the purpose of
artificially inflating the value of the stock so that they could
sell their shares at a profit.77
The Supreme Court reversed the denial of the SEC's
application for an i n j ~ n c t i o n . ~First,
~
after reviewing the
legislative history and applying principles of statutory
construction, the Court found that the SEC need not prove
scienter to establish a violation of section 206(2).79
Second, the Court held that the practice of scalping by a
registered investment adviser violates the antifraud
provision of the IAAS0 The Court focused on the
nondisclosure to the clients by the f i d u c i e l -- the
investment adviser -- of his practice of "secretly trad[ing] on
Such an
the market effect of his own recommendati~n."~~
adviser, the Court found:
may be motivated -- consciously or unconsciously -- to
recommend a given security not because of its
potential for long-run price increase (which would
profit the client), but because of its potential for
short-run price increase in response to anticipated
Id. a t 184.
76 Id. at 184-85.
77 Id. a t 185.
78 Id. a t 201.
79 Id. a t 195.
Id. a t 197.
The Court acknowledged that, through section 206 of the IAA,
Congress imposed a statutory fiduciary duty on investment advisers. Id.
a t 191-92.
82 Id. a t 196.
75
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activity from the recommendation (which would
profit the adviser). An investor seeking the advice of
a registered investment adviser must, if the
legislative purpose is to be served, be permitted to
evaluate such overlapping motivations, through
appropriate disclosure, in deciding whether an
adviser is serving I'hvo masters1' or only o n e . . .
"especially. . . if one of the masters happens to be
economic self-intere~t."'~

Thus, a trial court can reject the argument as irrelevant
that the adviser believed in his recommendation and "did not
offer it for the purpose of hrthering personal pecuniary
objective^."^^ Rather, the Court stated, "[ilt is the practice
itself. . . with its potential for abuse, which 'operates as a
fraud or deceit' within the meaning of the [IAAI when
The Court concluded
relevant information is s~ppressed."~~
that the SEC has the power to bring an action for injunctive
relief requiring an investment adviser to disclose his
personal interest in investments he recommends before
trading on the market effect of those recommendation^?^
Since Capital Gains, the SEC has brought several
enforcement proceedings under the anti-fraud provisions of
the IAA against investment advisers for failing to disclose
scalping conduct and other conflicts of interest in their
investment advice.87 For example, in Patrick Clements, the

83

Id. (quoting United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364

U.S.520, 549 (1961)). Thus, the trading is not fraudulent as long as it is
disclosed; it is the nondisclosure of the fiduciary that constitutes the
deceit.
Id. at 200.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 201. While the SEC in Capital Gains sought only an
injunction, Congress has since empowered the SEC, in the Securities
Enforcement and Remedies Act of 1990, to seek monetary penalties
against registered investment advisers for violations of the IAA. See 15
U.S.C. 3 80b-9(e)(2000).
" See, e.g., In re Kingsley, Jennison, McNulty & Morse, Inc., 50 S.E.C.
Docket 310, 1991 WL 288369, at "11 (S.E.C. Nov. 14, 1991) (censuring
investment adviser and its principal for failing to disclose to clients its
"soft dollar" commission arrangement with brokerage iirm and stating
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SEC found that an investment adviser, aided and abetted by
its president, violated sections 206(1) and (2) of the IAA by
failing to disclose in its investment letters -- which
recommended a certain stock -- that the president personally
purchased shares of that stock just prior to the
re~ommendation.~~
The president sold the shares for a loss
after the recommendation, but the SEC did not find it
relevant that the president lost money on the t r a n s a c t i ~ n . ~ ~
In some cases, the defendants did not even trade in the
securities following the recommendation; rather, the SEC
focused merely on the investment adviser's failure t o disclose
the potential conflict of interest in owning the recommended
securities as the violative conduct.g0

that "whenever trading by an investment advisor raises the possibility of a
potential conflict with the interests of his advisory clients, the investment
adviser has an affirmative obligation before engaging in such activities to
obtain the informed consent of his clients on the basis of full and fair
disclosure of all material facts" (quoting In re Kidder, Peabody & Co., et
al., 43 S.E.C. 911, 916 (1968))); In re Frank S. Arko, 12 S.E.C. Docket
1378, 1977 WL 176094 (S.E.C. Release No. 13801, July 25, 1977)
(reporting institution of administrative proceedings against registered
investment adviser under, inter alia, section 206 of the W for failing to
disclose scalping scheme with respect to securities in three different
companies); In re Patrick Clements, 42 S.E.C. 373, 1964 WL 66207 (S.E.C.
Oct. 12, 1964).
ss 1964 WL 66207.
Id. a t *5. The SEC concluded that "[elven though the shares were
sold a t a loss, the recommendation by [the investment adviser] of a stock
in which [the president] was trading without revealing his personal
interest in that stock constitutes fraudulent conduct."
See In re Chancellor Capital Management, 57 S.E.C. Docket 2204,
1994 WL 570098 (S.E.C. Oct. 18, 1994). In this case, the SEC found that
a n investment adviser and one of its portfolio managers violated section
206 and other sections of the IAA by failing to disclose to clients that, on a t
least two occasions, the portfolio manager recommended the purchase of
shares in a company in which he personally owned shares. The portfolio
manager had established business relationships with these companies and
acquired the securities for nominal consideration a s much as eighteen
months earlier, during the formation stages of the companies. Id. a t "3-4.
The SEC noted that the firm had a general policy instructing employees to
avoid conflicts of interest in making recommendations. Id. a t "2. The
SEC did not discuss whether the portfolio manager had sold his shares

Heinonline - - 2002 Colum. Bus. L . Rev. 650 2002

No. 3 5 3 11

ANALYSTS UNDISCLOSED CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

65 1

While there seems to be little doubt that the IAA imposes
strict liability for investment adviser scalping, claims under
the IAA for scalping activities are limited in scope for several
reasons. First, the IAA applies only to registered or
unregistered investment advisers, as defined in the sta t ~ t e . ~ ~
Thus, the SEC cannot rely on the IAA to bring disciplinary
violations against other industry participants, such as sellside research analysts. Second, it is well-settled that
investors do not have a private right of action for
compensatory damages under the strict liability provisions of
the IAA.92 Therefore, the investing public needed t o invoke
some other legal basis to sue industry participants for
making recommendations without disclosing their scalping
or other conflicts of intere~t.9~

following the investment recommendation, as it viewed the violating
conduct to be the lack of disclosure of the conflict of interest, not any postrecommendation trading. Id. a t "'6-7.
15 U.S.C. $gob-2(11)(2000).
92 Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19-20
(1979).
93 SROS also have disciplined their registered broker-dealers and their
associated persons for scalping conduct under SRO disciplinary rules. For
example, in In re Smith, Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 31 S.E.C. Docket
212, 1984 WL 53102 (Aug. 15, 1984), the SEC affirmed the American
Stock Eschange's finding that a member brokerage firm had violated the
Exchange's Constitution by engaging in conduct "inconsistent with just
and equitable principles of trade," i.e., scalping. The Exchange found that
Smith Barney effected certain transactions in options of a company in the
firm's proprietary account before disseminating to the firm's public
customers a research recommendation on that company. The SEC agreed
with the Exchange that, "[iln order to avoid any potential conflict of
interest, a firm should give its customers sufficient time to receive and
digest a research recommendation that represents a material change in
the firm's position before the firm trades the subject stock or related
options for its own account." Id. a t '$2. The Exchange did not bring this
disciplinary proceeding under anti-fraud provisions, and therefore, it
focused on the trading rather than the failure to disclose as the unlawful
conduct.
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B. Liability Under the 1934 Act for Scalping
As a result, after Capital Gains, both the SEC and private
plaintiffs seeking relief from tainted recommendations
looked to the most commonly-used statutory basis of liability
for securities fraud: the antifraud provisions of the SEA.g"
Today, a successful private plaintifP5 in a section lO(b)/Rule
lob-5 lawsuit must prove the following elements: (1) a
misrepresentation or omissiong6of materialg7fact, or other

Section lo@) of the SEA, 15 U.S.C. 5 78j(b) (2000), and Rule lob-5
promulgated by the SEC, 17 C.F.R. 3 240.10b-5 (2002), prohibit fraud in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities. Section 10(b)provides:
9.1

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange. . . (b) To use or employ, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a
national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, or any securities-based swap agreement. . .any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations a s the
Commission may prescribe a s necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Rule lob-5 provides:

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud . . . or (c) To engage in any act, practice,
or course of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person.
The scope of liability under Rule lob-5 "is coextensive with the coverage of
$ 10(b)." SEC v. Zandford, 122 S. Ct. 1899, 1901(2002). By contrast, the
anti-fraud provision of the SA prohibits fraud in connection with the offer
or purchase of securities. 15 U.S.C. 3 77q(a) (2000).
95 SEC V. Blavin, 760 F.2d 706, 711 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that,
contrary to a private plaintiff, the SEC need not prove the elements of
justifiable reliance or damages).
96 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980) (holding that
for liability premised on omissions, defendant must have a duty to
disclose).
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deceptive device, (2) in connection withg8the purchase or sale
(3) scienter by the defendant,loO
(4) justifiable
of a ~ecurity,9~
reliance by the plaintifFo1and (5) causing damage to the
plaintB.lo2
Several courts have allowed a plaintiff to pursue a
securities fiaud claim for failure t o disclose scalping and
other conflicts of interest in connection with the
recommendation of a security.lo3 For example, in Zweig,the
owners of one of the companies involved in a corporate
merger sued a newspaper financial columnist, alleging that
he violated section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 by writing a
favorable article about the other merging company without
disclosing that he owned stock in that company, and that he

" Information is deemed "material" if there is a substantial likelihood
that a reasonable investor would have considered it important in making
an investment decision. See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,
231-32 (1987); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449
(1976).
99 The Supreme Court interprets the "in connection with" requirement
broadly and has held that it is met as long as the scheme to defraud and
the securities transaction "coincide." Zandford, 122 S. Ct. a t 1906.
93 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731
(1975) (limiting those who have standing to sue under $ lo&) to
purchasers or sellers of securities).
loo See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 11.12 (1976)
(holding that private cause of action for damages under $ 10(b) and Rule
lob-5 will not lie absent scienter, defined in the opinion as "a mental state
embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or dehaud").
lo' Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128,15354 (1970) (holding that "all that is necessary is that the facts withheld be
material in the sense that a reasonable investor might have considered
them important in the making of the decision").
'02 For a general discussion of all of these elements, see POSER,
supra
note 21, a t $3.01[D1[21-161, $ 4.01LAI.
'03 See, e.g., Laird v. Integrated Resources, Inc., 897 F.2d 826 (5th Cir.
1990) (reversing grant of summary judgment to defendants on grounds
that investors alleged valid $ 10(b) claims against their investment
advisers for failure to disclose commissions received in recommended
investments); Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979); Barthe
v. Rizzo, 384 F. Supp. 1063, 1067 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ("It is clear that
[plaintiff investor] was entitled to know that lhis broker1 was in a position
to gain financially from the deal" which the broker recommended.).
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intended to sell some of the stock following the sharp rise in
price that his article would cause.lo4 During a bench trial,
the district court granted the columnist's motion to dismiss
on the grounds that plaintiffs theory of liability for scalping
under section 10(b)was not valid.lo5
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal
of the action, holding that the columnist's conflict of interest
was a material fact that his readers were entitled to know.lo6
The court of appeals reasoned that "[rleasonable investors
who read the column would have considered the motivations
of a financial columnist such as [defendant] important in
deciding whether to invest in the companies touted."lo7 The
court also found that defendant "assumed" a duty to disclose
the information withheld once he chose to "encourag[e]
purchases of the securities in the market."los The court
analogized the defendant to a corporate insider who
withholds material information about the company's
financial condition while trading in the stock, and found that
the financial columnist has the same duty to his audience to
avoid misleading them as to the reliance "they could place on
his
Finally, the court had little difficulty concluding that
plaintiff could prove scienter through the defendant's
knowledge of his ownership interests in the stock and his
intent to benefit from the column.110 Thus, the court held
that the federal securities laws:
require a financial columnist, in recommending a
security that he or she owns, t o provide the public
with all material information he or s h e has on that
security, including his or h e r ownership, and a n y
i n t e n t h e o r she m a y have (a) to score a quick profit
Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d a t 1262-63.
Id. a t 1263.
'06 Id. a t 1264-66.
lo'
Id. a t 1266.
'08 Id. a t 1268.
log Id. a t 1266-67.
"O
Id. a t 1271. Similarly, the court presumed reliance from the
nondisclosure, following the Supreme Court's decision in Affiliated Ute. Id.
lo4

'05
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on the recommendation, or (b) to allow or encourage
the recommendation to be published as an
advertisement in his or her own periodical.ll1

Private investors are not the only ones who have looked
to the broader antifraud provisions of the SEA. The SEC
enforcement staff has parlayed its success in scalping cases
against investment advisers t o bring enforcement
proceedings against an expanded universe of defendants,
including stock promoters and analysts, for failure to
disclose conflicts of interest under section 10(b)of the SEA.l12
The district court's decision in Blavin -- as one of the first
courts t o apply section 10(b) to scalping in an SEC
enforcement proceeding -- is instructive. In Blavin, the trial

"' Id. In dicta, the Ninth Circuit discussed how to measure the
damages: the difference between the actual market value of the merging
company and the inflated value due to the rise in price following the
defendant's misleading column. Id. a t 1269-70.
" See, e.g., SEC v. Park, 99 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D.Il1.2000) (motion to
dismiss denied on the grounds that securities information provider on the
Internet is subject to IAA); SEC v. Carlisle, et al., Litigation Release No.
15,949, 1998 WL 751084 (Oct. 27, 1998) (reporting filing of federal court
complaint against defendants, who provided investor relations and stock
promotion services, for scalping activities as violations of section 10(b) and
Rule lob-5 of the SEA and section 17(a) of the SA); SEC Wins Summary
Judgment Against Internet Microcap Stock Tout, SEC v. Huttoe,
Litigation Release No. 15,906, 68 S.E.C. Docket 174 (S.E.C. Release No.
15,906 Sept. 24, 1998) (reporting district court's grant of summary
judgment for the SEC against newsletter writer and publisher employee
for scalping);In re Ronald v. Speaker, 63 S.E.C. Docket 1640,1997 WL 987
(S.E.C. Release No. 38161, Jan. 13, 1997) (reporting simultaneous
institution and settlement of proceedings against investment adviser for
failing to disclose conflict of interest in recommendation); In re Penny
Stock Newsletter, Inc., 32 S.E.C. Docket 84,1984 WL 472325, at "4 (S.E.C.
Dec. 19, 1984) (following Zweig and imposing sanctions on publisher of
investment advisory newsletter under antifraud provisions of SEA and
IAA, as well as section 17(b)of SA, for failing to disclose four separate prerecommendation purchases and for falsely representing in newsletter that
he would not purchase or sell recommended securities within 30 days of
recommendation; the SEC concluded that "[slection 10(b) of the [SEA]
requires an investment adviser to disclose potential conflicts of interest.");
SEC v. Blavin, 557 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D.Mich. 19831, affd, 760 F.2d 706
(6th Cir. 1985).
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court granted summary judgment t o the SEC on its section
10(b)claim under the SEA as well as its section 206(2) claim
under the IAA.l13 Blavin was an unregistered investment
adviser who authored, published and disseminated to
subscribers and potential subscribers a newsletter that
discussed and recommended certain securities.l14 Blavin did
not dispute that, on numerous occasions, he owned or
purchased large amounts of these securities just prior to
publishing his "glowing" recommendation^.^^^ It was also
undisputed that Blavin failed t o disclose in the newsletter
that he personally owned shares in the companies he was
recommending.l16 The SEC also established that he sold his
shares at a significant profit by trading on the market effect
of his recommendations.l17 In fact, Blavin continued this
practice after the SEC began investigating his activities and
even after the SEC had obtained a preliminary injunction
against him in this case.l18
In holding that this conduct violated section 10(b), the
district court found that Blavin's failure to disclose his
conflicts of interest to his subscribers was a material
omission made with scienter in connection with the purchase
or sale of securities.llg First, because the "sole purpose" of
the newsletters was t o recommend the purchase of stock, the
court had no difficulty finding that Blavin's conduct met the
"in connection with" requirement of section 10(b).lZ0Second,
the court concluded that Blavin's failure to disclose his
ownership interests in and intent to sell the recommended
securities constituted a material omission.121
557 F. Supp. a t 1310-15.
""d.
a t 1308.
115 Id. a t 1311.
116 Id.
'I7
Id. a t 1308-09.
Id. a t 1309. These additional violations in the face of a preliminary
injunction resulted in a criminal contempt conviction against Blavin. Id.
' I 9 Id. a t 1310.
120 Id. a t 1310-11.
12'
Id. a t 1311 (relying on Zweig and stating that "[clourts have
uniformly held that such schemes violate the securities Law [sic] and that
'I3
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Finally, the district court found that Blavin acted with
scienter because the "pattern of Blavin's activity creates an
overwhelming presumption that this activity was
intentional."122Blavin testified at his deposition that he
purposefully concealed from the SEC (once the investigation
had begun) his large purchase of one particular stock
"because he knew it would look wrong in view of the fact that
he had recommended [the
Finally, Blavin filed a
form with the SEC contemporaneous with his violative
conduct stating that he would not buy or sell a security
recommended in his newsletter for 60 days before or after
This constituted "clear
making such a re~ommendation.~~~
evidence Blavin knew that his scalping activities were
wrong."125
However, neither the Sixth Circuit nor the district court
in Blavin mentioned the Supreme Court's decisions in
Chiarella v. United StateslZ6and Dirks v. SEC,lZ7both insider
a failure to disclose such a 'scalping' scheme is a material omission
prohibited by 8 10(b)"). On appeal, the Sixth Circuit specifically af£irmed
this holding, and stated that "[tlhe effect of such large holdings on Blavin's
objectivity in making investment recommendations would be particularly
important to his clients." 760 F.2d a t 711. The district court also agreed
with the SEC that certain company information in the newsletters
contained material misstatements and omissions. 557 F. Supp. at 1311.
557 F.Supp. a t 1312. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit questioned the
district court's finding that the defendant acted intentionally, but held
that the district court did not need to reach the issue of intent because the
defendant's conduct certainly was reckless and thus satisfied the
"recklessness" prong of scienter. 760 F.2d at 712 ("At a minimum, Blavin
recklessly failed to disclose that he was trading in stocks that his
newsletter recommended.").
557 F. Supp. at 1312.
lZ4 Id.
Id. The court also found that the same conduct violated sections
206(1), (2) and (4) of the IAA,where the SEC did not have to prove
scienter. Id. at 1315.
*%5 U.S. 222 (1980) (pre-dating Blavin). In Chiarella, the Court
refused to impose insider trading liability on a printer who learned
through his printing clients about their upcoming tender offers and then
bought stock in the target companies. The Court found that the
defendant's silence could not be the basis of fraud because he had no duty
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trading cases, where the Court held that there can be no
section 10(b) liability for omissions absent a duty to
disc10se.l~~Nor did the Blavin court address whether the
defendant had a duty t o disclose. Thus, under current
Supreme Court jurisprudence, the scope of section 10(b) and
Rule lob-5 arguably is more limited than that recognized by
the Ninth Circuit in Zweig, or even the Sixth Circuit in
B1a~in.l~~
Alternatively, one can infer that the district court, while
calling the defendant's failure t o disclose a "material
omission," implicitly treated the omission as one that
renders an affirmative statement (the recommendation in
the newsletter) materially misleading, and therefore the
SEC did not have to establish the existence of a duty t o
disclose. The Sixth Circuit's treatment of the issue was more
direct: it considered the failure to disclose the extent of
defendant's ownership in the recommended securities and
to disclose arising out of a relationship of trust and confidence. The
defendant's ability to utilize non-public information because of his position
in the marketplace did not impose on him such a duty.
127 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (post-dating district court's, but pre-dating
Sixth Circuit's decision in Blavin). Dirks was a n analyst and a n officer of a
brokerage firm who received a tip from a former officer of an insurance
company that the company's assets were overvalued as a result of fraud.
After investigating the allegations, Dirks informed his clients,
institutional investors, about the fraud, and the clients sold their shares in
the company. The SEC found him liable under $ 10(b) as an aider and
abettor of the insider trading of his clients, but the Supreme Court
reversed, concluding that Dirks was not liable because he had no duty to
the company's shareholders. Moreover, the officer who had tipped him
about the fraud had not breached his duty to the shareholders because his
motive for disclosing -- to expose the fraud -- was laudable.
Dirks, 63 U.S. a t 230; Chiarella, 445 U.S. a t 228.
12'
Since Zweig also pre-dates Chiarella and Dirks, the Ninth Circuit
has questioned its holding in Zweig with respect to the duty to disclose.
See Feldman v. Simkins Indus., 679 F.2d 1299, 1304 (9th Cir. 1982).
However, other courts still consider Zweig to be good law. See SEC v.
Park, 99 F.Supp.2d 889, 899 (N.D.Il1. 2000). For a more general
discussion of how several significant Supreme Court opinions in the 1980s
narrowed the scope of civil liability under the SEA, see Roberta S. Karmel,
Outsider Trading on Confidential Information -- A Breach in Search of a
Duty, 20 CARDOZO
L. REV.83, 90-92 (1998).
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the post-recommendation trading as material facts that
rendered the disclaimer in the newsletters misleading.130
Under this treatment, the Dirks and Chiarella decisions -while narrowing the scope of section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 in
the context of omissions -- have little impact on the result in
Blavin.
Recent legislation has further limited the scope of section
10(b)and Rule lob-5. Plaintiffs filing their claims in federal
court (as opposed to bringing an arbitration proceeding)
must satisfy the strict pleading requirements of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA").131
Plaintiffs must allege with specificity "each statement
alleged to have been misleading" as well as "the reason or
reasons why the statement is misleading."132In addition, in
order to satisfy the element of scienter, the plaintiff must
"state with particularity facts giving rise t o a strong
inference that defendant acted with the required state of
&d.11133
Furthermore, because sell-side analysts are by definition
employed by broker-dealers who are members of the NASD,
many investor claims against analysts, particularly against
those who work for the same firm with which the customer
has the relevant trading account, would be brought as
~
securities SRO
securities arbitration ~ 1 a i m s . l ~However,

SEC V. Blavin, 760 F.2d 706,711 (6th Cir. 1985).
131 15 U.S.C. 5 78u-4 (2000).
13' 15 U.S.C. $78~-4(b)(l)
(2000).
(2000).
15 U.S.C. 5 78~-4(b)(2)
NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure 10301 requires member firms
and their associated persons to arbitrate, upon a customer's demand,
"[alny dispute, claim or controversy. . . arising in connection with the
business of such member or in connection with the activities of such
associated persons . . .." Moreover, most customers' agreements with
their brokerage firms contain pre-dispute arbitration agreements
("PDAA"), requiring arbitration of disputes arising out of the account. See
Black & Gross, supra note 23, a t 991. Whether or not an investor's claim
against an analyst employed by a firm other than the one where the
investor was a customer can be arbitrated pursuant to Rule 10301 or the
PDAA would be a litigable issue.
130
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arbitration rules do not permit class action arbitration^.'^^
Thus, class action plaintiffs must, under the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 ("SLUSA"),136
bring almost any securities fraud claim in federal court
rather than in state court. Because investor claims against
sell-side analysts are likely to be brought as class actions,
section 10(b)and Rule lob-5 will supply the primary basis of
analysts' potential liability towards investors.
Some of these class actions have not survived the
pleading stage. For example, a series of class action lawsuits
were brought against Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co.
("MSDW) and its employee, the well-known research
analyst Mary Meeker. Plaintiffs -- open market purchasers
of stocks covered by Meeker -- filed the complaints under the
PSLRA in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York. The complaints alleged that MSDW
and Meeker violated, inter alia, section 10(b)and Rule lob-5
of the SEA by recommending the purchase of several
Internet stocks (AOL Time Warner, amazon.com, and Ebay)
without disclosing Meeker's conflicts of interest based on
financial arrangements with the issuer.13' The complaints
alleged that Meeker used the positive recommendations t o
drum up investment banking business for her employer,
MSDW, and that Meeker was compensated, in part, on the
basis of the investment banking business she generated.13$
The complaints did not survive the pleading stage, however,
as the court dismissed them without prejudice, sua ~ p o n t e , ' ~ ~
See, e.g., NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure 10301(d).
13'
15 U.S.C. 9 78bb(f) (2000).
137
Tamara Loomis, Analyst Accountability: Suits Over Stock
Recommendations Pose New Wrinkle, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 16,2001, at 5.
Id.
13'
See Senders v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. ¶ 91,536, 2001 WL 958927 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2001); Stein v. Morgan
Stanley Dean Witter & Co., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 91,537, 2001 WL 958936
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2001); Lloyd v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co.,
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 191,538, 2001 WL 959190 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2001);
Thomson v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1
91,539,2001 WL 958925 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21,2001); Soto v. Morgan Stanley
Dean Witter & Co., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 91,540, 2001 WL 958929 (S.D.N.Y.
13'
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on the grounds that they violated Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a)(2)requiring "a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled t o relief."140

IV. UNDISCLOSED CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AS A
PRIVATE VIOLATION OF RULE 10B-5
The author is unaware of any case awarding damages t o
an investor who brought a claim for securities fraud under
the SEA against an analyst or other industry participant
lacking a fiduciary duty to the investor for recommending a
secuity in a research report without disclosing conflicts of
interest.141 However, when publicly disseminating a research
report, an analyst's failure t o disclose his ownership of the
recommended stock or any compensation arrangements
related to his firm's investment banking activities for the
issuer should lead to section 10(b)/Rule lob-5 liability to an
investor who invests in reliance on that research report (the
"misrepresentation"), as the conduct appears to satisfy each
of the elements a private plaintiff must prove to prevail.
Moreover, imposing such liability squares with the
"fundamental purpose" of the SEA to implement a
"philosophy of full disclosure" to protect the integrity of the

Aug. 21, 2001); Pludo v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. 91,541,2001 WL 958922 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21,2001).
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). The court did not describe or even mention
the substance of the securities fraud allegations, as it dismissed the
complaints -- which were replete with quotes from and references to media
coverage of Meeker -- due to "pleading improprieties" it considered "gross
and unrestrained." See, e.g., Pludo, 2001 WL 958922, a t "1.
141 Rvo recent cases with unusual facts have survived a motion to
dismiss. Cyber Media Group, Inc. v. Island Mortgage Network, Inc., 183
F. Supp. 2d 559 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (discussed inf-ra notes 152-56 and
accompanying tex-t); In re Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. Secs. Litig.,
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶90,306,1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20,
1998) (denying motion to dismiss class action complaint against brokerdealer and an employee of its proprietary trading group who issued
"Trading Notes" in the form of a n analyst research report containing
negative information about the issuers without disclosing that the h n
had a short position in the covered securities).
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securities markets.142As the Supreme Court first announced
in Capital Gains Research and has announced repeatedly
since then, in enacting the SEA, Congress sought to "achieve
a high standard of business ethics in the securities

A. Materiality
First, courts routinely deem "material"144the fact that an
individual or entity recommending a security has a personal
financial interest in the security andlor the issuer -- no
matter how small the stake.145An analyst might argue that
an undisclosed small stake in the recommended security, in
the context of a well-researched and analyzed report, is not

14* Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977)
(quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128,151 (19721,
quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963));
see also 'United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997) (stating that
the "animating purpose of the Exchange Act" is "to insure honest
securities markets and thereby promote investor confidence").
143 SEC V. Zandford, 122 S. Ct. 1899, 1900 (2002) (quoting Affiliated
Ute Citizens of Utah, 406 U.S. a t 151).
See supra note 97 for the definition of materiality.
145 See, e.g., SEC v. Blavin, 760 F.2d 706, 711 (6th Cir. 1985) (stating
that "[tlhe effect of such large holdings on Blavin's objectivity in making
investment recommendations would be particularly important to his
clients"); Chasins v. Smith Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1172 (2d Cir.
1970) (finding nondisclosure of market-making activity of broker in
recommended security material); Addeo v. Braver, 956 F. Supp. 443, 452
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that "though defendant's [undisclosed1
commission was small, the court cannot say, as a matter of law, that the
potential conflict of interest arising out of the commission would not have
been material in the eyes of a reasonable investor"); Capital District
Physician's Health Plan v. O'Higgins, 951 F. Supp. 352, 356 (N.D.N.Y.
1997) (holding that a failure of investment adviser to disclose conflict of
interest was material omission); SEC v. Hasho, 784 F. Supp. 1059, 1110
(S.D.N.Y. 1992); Shivangi v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 107 F.R.D. 313,
318 (S.D. Miss. 1985) (holding that "a person recommending a stock must
disclose if he will gain financially from the sale above and beyond normal
compensation"); Barthe v. Rizzo, 384 F. Supp. 1063, 1067 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(holding that customer was entitled to know that his broker "was in a
position to gain financially" from the recommendation).
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material. Instead, some investors might be comforted to
know that the analyst owned the stock, as a sign that the
analyst had faith in the long-term performance of the issuer.
However, every analyst report carries the implied
representation that the analyst is disinterested, unbiased
and objective, and this representation may be rendered
materially misleading by the analyst's ownership of the
stock. As courts have stated repeatedly, the investor is
entitled t o know that the recommendation might have been
motivated -- even subconsciously -- by the recommender's
own financial interest rather than the investment value of
the recommended security.146

B. "In Connection With"
Second, the Supreme Court construes the "in connection
with" element quite broadly.14' Therefore, the mere fact that
the analyst's misstatement or nondisclosure appeared in a
securities research report or recommendation should suffice
to meet the "in connection with" requirement.148

'46 See, e.g., Addeo, 956 F. Supp. a t 452; Credit Suisse, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16560, at '"19-20 (concluding that "a reasonable investor would
have discounted the projections in the report if the investor had been
aware of the [firm's] self-interest"); see also Capital Gains, 375 U.S. a t 196
(holding that an investor must "be permitted to evaluate [even
unconscious] overlapping motivations").
'47 See, e.g., Zandford, 122 S. Ct. a t 1900 (reversing Fourth Circuit's
narrow interpretation of "in connection with" requirement and holding
that element is met even if there is no "misrepresentation about the value
of a particular security"); OIHagan,521 U.S. a t 655-56 (concluding that "in
connection with" element met as long as securities transaction and
nondisclosure in breach of duty coincide); Superintendent of Insurance v.
Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971) (holding that "section 10(b)
must be read flexibly, not technically and restrictively. Since there was a
'sale' of a security and since fraud was used 'in connection with' it, there is
redress under Q 10(b), whatever might be available as a remedy under a
state law").
14'
See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968)
(en bane), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (finding that "in connection
with" requirement permits section 10(b) to reach any device on which a
reasonable investor would rely); see also SEC v. Gorsek, 2001 WL
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C. Scienter
Unlike under the IAA, the antifraud provisions of the
SEA require proof of scienter -- an intent to deceive or
recklessness.149In all of the scalping cases, the defendants
traded against their recommendations without disclosure of
the trading. While the author has found no case expressly
ruling that a sell-side analyst acted with scienter based
merely on an undisclosed conflict of interest, rather than
undisclosed trading, the cases suggest that the lack of any
post-recommendation trading by an analyst who
recommends the purchase of a stock without disclosing his
personal financial interest in the stock does not preclude a
finding of scienter -- even though the analyst does not profit
off of the short-term effect of his market reco~nmendation.~~~

34001242, a t "9 (C.D.Il1. Apr. 20,2001) (ruling that defendants' actions in
attempting to influence investment decisions were done "in connection
with" the sale of securities); SEC v. Park, 99 F. Supp.2d 889, 900-01
(N.D.Il1.2000) (finding that the omissions were made "in connection with"
the purchase or sale of securities, as the allegations demonstrated that
defendants expected their subscribers to act on their advice by purchasing
securities); Castillo v. Dean Witter Discover & Co., 1998 WL 342050, a t '*7
(S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1998) (holding the omission that, inter alia, brokers
recommending funds had economic interest in the recommendation was
"in connection with" the purchase of securities); Blavin, 557 F. Supp. a t
1310-11.
While the Supreme Court expressly left open the issue of whether
reckless conduct can constitute scienter (Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 193-94 n.12 (197611, every circuit court that has addressed this
issue has found that it does. See POSER,supra note 21, a t 5 3.01[D1[41.
Recklessness for purposes of establishing scienter is defined a s "those
highly unreasonable omissions or misrepresentations that involve not
merely simple or even inexcusable negligence, but a n extreme departure
from the standards of ordinary care, and that present a danger of
misleading buyers or sellers which is either known to the defendant or is
so obvious that the defendant must have been aware of it." Id. (quoting
McDonald v. Alan Bush Brokerage Co., 863 F.2d 809, 814 (11th Cir.
1989)).
150 See Z~veigv. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261, 1271 (9th Cir. 1979)
(finding scienter based on defendant's knowledge of his ownership
interests in the stock and his intent to benefit from the recommendation);
SEC v. Gorsek, 2001 WL 34001242, a t "8-9 (finding that the SEC proved
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Other conduct or circumstances may suffice, such as
evidence indicating the analysts did not believe their own
recommendations or acknowledging the recommendations as
necessary to support their investment banking colleague^.'^^
Very recently, a district court refused to dismiss a
complaint alleging section 10(b)violations against an analyst
for failing to disclose his conflict of interest, despite the lack
of post-recommendation trading.152In that case, plaintiff, an
Internet advertising firm, alleged that defendants made
material misrepresentations and omissions during
negotiations to enter into a stock purchase agreement
between defendant Apponline.com ("AOP) and Cyber Media
Group ("CMG), pursuant to which AOP would buy the
outstanding shares of CMG in exchange for shares of AOP.153
Plaintiffs sued, among others, a hancial analyst and CNN
commentator who once touted AOP as a "double-your-money"
in~estrnent.'~~ Plaintiffs alleged that his statement
promoting the stock could be an actionable material
misstatement and that his failure to disclose that he stood to
gain financially by an increase in the value of the stock he
was touting could be an actionable material
The
scienter for defendants who failed to disclose their own potential for gain
when issuing purportedly independent opinions on securities). But see
Stanley S. Arkin, Analysts' Conflicts of Interest: Where's the Crime?,
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 14, 2002, at 3 (arguing that, absent conduct such as postrecommendation trading, it would be difficult to establish scienter).
15' For example, the New York State Attorney General gathered a
series of e-mails from Merrill Lynch analysts indicating that the analysts
believed the companies they were recommending were not as financially
sound as their recommendations indicated but did not disclose such lack of
confidence, because the recommendations supported Merrill Lynch's
undenvriting efforts on behalf of those same companies. See Dinallo Aff.,
supra note 10.
l5*yber
Media Group, Inc. v. Island Mortgage Network, Inc., 183 F.
Supp.2d 559 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
Id. a t 566.
'" Id. a t 567. The analyst, Courtney Smith, was CEO of a venture
capital fund that owned AOP stock, and his compensation as CEO
included stock in the fund, whose value rose as the value of AOP stock
rose. Id.
15' Id. at 574.
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district court held that the omission could be material and
that plaintiffs adequately pled scienter, just by virtue of the
analyst's access to information about AOP and his
undisclosed conflict of interest.156
Furthermore, relying on prior decisions that infer scienter
by a securities industry professional merely from the breach
of a regulatory rule,15" a plaintiff can also claim that any
breach of the new NASD and NYSE rules of conduct
constitutes, at a minimum, reckless conduct. Thus, based
merely on the breach of NASD Rule 2711 or NYSE Amended
Rule 472, a court could find that an analyst acted with the
requisite scienter.15*While the Supreme Court has held that
mere breach of a professional duty does not support a claim
for securities fraud due to the lack of deception,159that
element is met here where the analyst disseminates a
research report with the knowledge that disclosure is
mandated by regulations and with the implied

Id. The court ignored the element of "duty to disclose" entirely,
presumably because it regarded the omission a s one, like the one in
BLavin, that rendered a n affirmative statement misleading.
See, e.g., Newton v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
135 F.3d 266, 273 (3d Cir. 1998) (concluding that broker's knowing
violation of duty of best execution would allow a fact-finder to find that
broker acted recklessly); Brown v. The E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d
1020, 1031 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that "[slcienter may be inferred by
finding that the defendant knew or reasonably believed that" his
recommendation violated the suitability rule); Vucinich v. Paine, Webber,
Jackson, & Curtis, Inc., 803 F.2d 454, 460 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that
breach of broker's duty to make suitable recommendations is a "reckless
violation of Section 10(b)"). But see Laird v. Integrated Resources, Inc., 897
F.2d 826, 836 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that failure to comply with
disclosure regulations of the IAA "does not create per se liability under
rule lob-5").
15'
Cf.Shivangi v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 825 F.2d 885, 889 (5th
Cir. 1987) (declining to find scienter because the alleged omission was not
conclusively determined to be material by regulators or the courts a t the
time of the purchase).
15'
Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 470, 474-76 (1977)
(insisting on a finding of "deception," defined as the making of a material
misrepresentation or the nondisclosure of material information in
violation of a duty to disclose).
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representation of objectivity and neutrality where that
neutrality is seriously and knowingly compromised by his
own economic interests.

D. Duty to Disclose
Because section 206 of the IAA establishes a statutory
federal fiduciary duty for investment advisers,160 the SEC
and the courts, even after Dirks, have not hesitated to find
the requisite duty to disclose in cases against investment
advisers -- registered or unregistered.161 However, where
does the duty to disclose originate, absent the fiduciary
relationship of the investment adviser?
The SEC faced just such a dilemma recently in SEC v.
Park.162 In that case, the SEC sued a website operator who
recommended the purchase of securities t o website
subscribers without disclosing that he intended t o trade on
the market effects of his recommendations. The SEC
charged that the defendants, including the individual
defendant who called himself "Tokyo Joe" and operated the
website tokyojoe.com, violated the antifraud provisions of the
I M and the SEA through his ~ca1ping.l~~
Defendants moved
to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that Tokyo Joe was
not an investment adviser within the meaning of the IAA,
and that, with respect t o the section 10(b)/Rule lob-5 claim
concerning omissions, the SEC failed t o allege that
defendants had a duty t o disclose their scalping scheme and
that the misstatements were not made "in connection with"
the purchase or sale of securities.l'j4
See Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11,17

lEO

(1979).

See In re Penny Stock Newsletter, Inc., 32 S.E.C. Docket 84, 1984
WL 472325, a t :':4(S.E.C. Dec. 19,1984) (stating that "Islection 10(b) of the
[SEA] requires an investment adviser to disclose potential conflicts of
interest"); SEC v. Blavin, 557 F. Supp. 1304,1311 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (while
not identifying a "duty to disclose" as an independent element of a 10(b)
violation, recognizing the fiduciary duty imposed by the IAA).
99 F. Supp.2d 889 (N.D. Ill.2000).
I* Id. a t 892.
lffl Id.
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The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
denied the motion. First, the court held that the SEC
alleged facts sufficient to support the conclusion that
defendants were investment advisers within the meaning of
the IAA.165 Second, the district court found that the
defendants had a "duty to disclose" and that the material
omissions were made "in connection with" the sale of
securities.
With respect to a duty to disclose, the court noted the
Chiarella rule that "[flraud liability does not attach for
failure to disclose material information unless a party is
under the duty to disclose."166 However, the court rejected
the SEC's argument that the duty to disclose under the SEA
arose from the defendants' legal status as investment
advisers.167 Rather, with little explanation, the court
reasoned that the duty "must arise from a relationship
outside securities law."16*
The court then reasoned that defendants' alleged ongoing
relationship with their subscribers -- which included daily
electronic communications and the payment of a substantial
fee for defendants' stock picks and advice -- provided the
necessary relationship of trust and confidence. Analogizing
the defendants to the newspaper columnist in Zweig,"j9 the

Id. a t 893-896. The district court also rejected defendants' First
Amendment claim. Id. a t 896-98.
'" Id. a t 899 (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228
(1980)).
Id. Comparing the Supreme Court's holdings in Capital Gains and
Dirks, the court found the Capital Gains' imposition of a duty on
investment advisers applies to claims only brought under the IAA and
that the Dirks' requirement of a duty outside the general duty to comply
with the law is more applicable to claims under the SEA. Id. Thus, the
district court implicitly dismissed prior authority which finds the requisite
duty based merely on defendants' status a s investment advisers.
16$ Id.
Id. The district court expressly rejected the view that the holding
in Chiarella overruled Zweig. Id. (stating that the Supreme Court in
Chiarella "nowhere held that someone who encourages people to buy
certain stocks and who also charges a fee to these people for this advice
has no duty to disclose his interest in the stock).
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court concluded that, like the columnist in Zweig who
"assumed the duty t o disclose" by encouraging purchases in
securities with an intent t o gain personally, the defendants
in Park who "intend[ed] to engage in scalping" similarly
"assume[d] a duty to disclose [their] interest in the targeted
Research analysts who place "buy" recommendations on
companies also assume a duty to disclose their personal or
institutional financial self-interests. Just as market-makers
must disclose the fact that they make a market -- and thus
have a financial interest in trades -- sell-side analysts must
disclose when they are not as disinterested as the industry
holds them out to be.
Another way around the duty to disclose is to frame the
allegations in terms of an affirmative misrepresentation
made misleading by the failure to disclose the conflict, rather
than in terms of a material omission, in which case the
plaintifY need not allege nor prove a duty t o disclose. This is
precisely what the Blavin court did: it circumvented the need
to prove a duty t o disclose by characterizing the "omission"of
the disclosure of the conflict of interest as one that rendered
an existing statement materially misleading.
In one criminal case, prosecutors followed precisely this
strategy in a RICO and conspiracy prosecution involving a
myriad of predicate acts, including securities fraud, allegedly
committed by defendants and all designed to defraud the

Id. a t 900. Subsequent to the decision, Park settled the SEC's
enforcement action by consenting to entry of an order permanently
enjoining him from violating the securities laws and ordering that he
disgorge $324,934 and pay $429,696 in civil penalties. SEC News Release,
SEC Settles Securities Fraud Action Against "Tokyo Joe" Internet Stock
Picker Required to Give Up All Illegal Profits, Pay a Penalty of More than
$400,000 and Consent to the Entry of an Anti-fraud Injunction, 2001 WL
226174 (S.E.C. Mar. 8, 2001). In the press release issued in conjunction
with the settlement, then SEC Enforcement Director Richard Walker
claimed that the case established "ground-breaking precedent," in that it
imposed on those in the business of offering stock advice over the Internet
the same duties as an investment adviser to disclose conflicts of interest.
Id.

Heinonline - - 2002 Colum. Bus. L . Rev. 669 2002

670

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2002

investing public.171 The indictment alleged, inter alia, that
defendants, principals of a brokerage firm,172disseminated
materially false and misleading research reports
recommending certain securities without disclosing (1)their
financial interest in those securities, (2) the fact that they
had bribed portfolio managers of mutual funds t o purchase
the recommended securities t o create trading volume, (3)
their expectation that the reports and the artificial volume
would cause a rise in price of the recommended securities,
and (4) their intent to trade and profit on the market effect of
their bribery and fraudulent recommendation^.^^^
Two of the defendants moved to dismiss the conspiracy
and RICO counts on the grounds that they had not
committed the underlying offense and predicate act of
securities fraud because, as in Chiarella and Dirks,
defendants had no duty t o disclose the alleged omissions.174
The government argued that Chiarella and Dirks applied
only to insider trading cases -- where a defendant trades on
the basis of inside information, but remains silent t o the
'I1 See United States v. Eisenberg, 773 F. Supp. 662, 662 (D.N.J.
1991). For a similar decision in a companion case against the analyst, see
U.S. v. Cannistraro, 800 F. Supp. 30 (D.N.J. 1992). In Eisenberg, the
government charged the defendants with RICO violations, conspiracy to
commit racketeering, and conspiracy to commit securities fraud. 773 F.
Supp. a t 672. The indictment alleged that the securities fraud served as
predicate acts to the RICO violations. While Congress later amended the
federal RICO statute to expressly preclude securities fraud as a predicate
act (see Pub. L. No. 104-67, $$ 107, 109 Stat. 737,758 (19951, amending 18
U.S.C. 5 1964(c) (199411, this amendment should not affect the analysis in
this section. The indictment also charged one of the defendants with
obstruction of justice, but those charges are not relevant to this discussion.
773 F. Supp. a t 672.
'I2 Defendant Eisenberg was an owner and president of the firm,
defendant Cannistraro was a securities research analyst a t the firm, and
defendant Bertoli had a controlling and beneficial interest in several
accounts a t the firm. Id. a t 673.
'I3 Id. a t 674-76. The indictment alleged that defendants purchased
the recommended securities just before issuing materially false and
misleading research reports, solely with the intent to sell those securities
immediately following the dissemination of the reports. Id,
'I4 Id. a t 717-18.
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investing public with respect to the inside information, and
not t o cases involving securities fraud based on scalping and
bribery.175
Agreeing with the government, Judge Lechner denied
defendants' motion. The court stated that "[slection 10(b)
makes illegal any 'manipulative or deceptive device,' which
term has come to be defined as 'intentional or willful conduct
designed t o deceive or defraud investors by controlling or
g price of se~urities.""~~
In light of this
artificially ~ e c t i n the
principle, Judge Lechner followed Blavin's holding that
scalping allegations need not be analyzed in terms of a duty
to disclose, as is the case for insider trading allegations, but
in terms of a public statement rendered misleading by the
omission of the material inf~rmation.'~~
Thus, the court held
that, notwithstanding the presence or absence of defendants'
duty to disclose, the government stated a viable securities
fraud claim by alleging that defendants intentionally
disseminated research reports because their nondisclosures
rendered the reports false and mi~1eading.l~~

E. Reliance
A securities fraud plaintiff must also prove that
defendant's misrepresentation or omission caused him to
purchase the recommended security, also known as the
element of "transaction causation." An investor can satisfy
this element by demonstrating that he relied on the analyst's
report containing the misstatement when deciding to
purchase the recommended security. Under this theory,

'" Id. a t 718.

'" Id. a t 721 (citations omitted).
'" Id. a t 721-23. The court also

cited to the Supreme Court's
statement in Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 209 n.56 (19851, holding that
"public dissemination of publications timed to specific market activity, or
to events affecting or having the ability to affect the securities industry,
i.e., scalping," is "dangerous activity and covered by section 10(b)." 773 F.
Supp. a t 723.
''' Id. a t 723; accord In re Credit Suisse, First Boston Corp. Secs.
Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 90,306, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXS 16560, a t
"'16-18 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20,1998).
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plaintiffs who reviewed the analyst's report can prove actual
reliance on the misstatement or nondisclosure through
evidence demonstrating that they would not have purchased
the recommended securities if they had known of the conflict
of interest faced by the ana1y~t.l'~Additionally, a plaintiff
may be entitled to a presumption of reliance in certain
situations.180 First, in cases of material omissions rather
than affirmative misstatements, an investor is entitled t o a
presumption of reliance.lsl
Second, in cases of affirmative misstatements, investor
plaintiffs need not prove reliance if they invoke the fraud-onthe-market d 0 ~ t r i n e . l ~Under
~
this doctrine, plaintiffs are
entitled to a rebuttable presumption of direct reliance if they
relied on the integrity of an efficient market where face-toNotably,
~
one factor that
face transactions do not 0 c ~ u r . l ~
courts look t o in determining whether the security traded in
an efficient market is the existence of a significant number of
analyst reports covering the security.lS4 Therefore, unless
the analyst in question is the only one who covered the
pertinent security, the mere fact that there was analyst
coverage of the security should help t o establish the fraudon-the-market presumption.
Moreover, courts have held that an investor's reliance on
an investment advisor who, in turn, relied on the integrity of
the market does not bar the investor from invoking the
reliance-on-the-market d0~trine.l~~Since virtually all
179

Of course, a t any trial, the investor would have to prove he or she
received and reviewed the analyst's report, or that the broker who
recommended the security relied on the report.
lso See Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259
F.3d 154, 174 (3d Cir. 2001).
la' See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128,
154 (1972).
la2 See Basic, 485 U.S. a t 247.
Id.; see also Credit Suisse, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16560, a t "23-24.
See Freeman v. Laventhol & Honvath, 915 F.2d 193, 199 (6th Cir.
1990); Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264,1286-87 (D.N.J. 1989).
See Margolis v. Caterpillar, Inc., 815 F. Supp. 1150, 1156-57 (C.D.
Ill. 1991); Grossman v. Waste Management, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 395, 403-06
(N.D. Ill. 1984).
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securities covered by a research analyst are traded in an
efficient market, a plaintiff could sue an analyst without the
need t o prove reliance or transaction causation.

F. Causation
The PSLRA provides that, in any private securities fraud
claim under Rule lob-5, "the plaintiff shall have the burden
of proving that the [alleged fraudulent] act or omission of the
defendant. . . caused the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to
recover damages."186 This is known as the element of "loss
causation" -- proving that the reason for the investment's
decline in value stems from the defendant's misstatements.ls7
If the investor can show that the price of the security had
risen in response to the analyst's positive report containing a
material misrepresentation, then the investor should be able
to satisfy the element of loss causation.1ss Moreover, analyst
reports clearly contribute t o the market's valuation of the
security, as most times an analyst issues a "buy" or
otherwise positive recommendation on a security the market
price for the security rises immediately thereafter.lsg The
investor could argue that, had the investing public known
that the analyst had an economic incentive to tout the stock,
the stock price would not have been influenced by the
analyst's report t o the extent that it was. The investor could

15 U.S.C. 5 78u-4(b)(4)(2000).
lS7 See Citibank, N.A. v. K-H Corp., 968 F.2d 1489,1495 (2d Cir. 1992)
(Misstatements must be "the cause of the transaction's turning out to be a
losing one."); Castillo v. Dean Witter Discover & Co, 1998 WL 342050, a t
5-7 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1998) (dismissing complaint by customers against
their brokers for failure to disclose compensation for failure to plead, inter
alia, loss causation).
See Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 95 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding
complaint adequately pled loss causation where plaintiffs alleged that the
market price dropped once the market became aware of the undisclosed
material information, even if the initial nondisclosure did not inflate the
stock's value).
lS9 See, e.g., In re PeopleSoR, Inc., 2000 WL 1737936, at ''4 (N.D.Cal.
May 25, 2000) (acknowledging that "[alnalysts have. . . clear and
immediate influence on the stock market").
lU6
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prove this element through evidence showing that the price
of the security dropped once the market became aware of the
analyst's conflicts.Ig0

G. Damages
Finally, plaintiffs relying on an analyst's recommendation
must prove they suffered damages as a result of the
nondisclosure of the conflict of interest.lgl If the plaintiff can
prove reliance and causation, and the plaintiff lost money as
a result of engaging in the recommended transaction,
presumably that plaintiff could satisfy the damages
requirement.lg2

V. CONCLUSION
Investors who have lost money in securities transactions
undertaken in reliance on recommendations by analysts who
had undisclosed conflicts of interest inherent in their
recommendations should be able t o sue their analysts for the
resulting losses under the federal securities laws. There is
no credible distinction between buy-side and sell-side
analysts that justifies differing disclosure obligations. Both
buy-side and sell-side analysts hold themselves out as
providers of independent and disinterested research reports
on issuers, and both types of analysts know that investors
rely, in part, on these research reports when making their
investment decisions.

190

Id.

The PSLRA now limits damages in SEA lawsuits to "the difference
between the purchase or sale price paid or received.. . and the mean
trading price of that security during the 90-day period beginning on the
date on which the information correcting the misstatement or omission
that is the basis for the action is disseminated to the market." 15 U.S.C. Q
78u-4(e) (2000). This codifies the "out-of-pocket" measure as the
applicable measure of damages in Rule lob-5 actions.
lg2 Cf. Capital District Physician's Health Plan v. O'Higgins, 951 F.
Supp. 352, 356-57 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (granting award to investor under Rule
lob-5 for damages flowing from undisclosed conflict of interest by
investment adviser).
lgl
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As the Supreme Court noted long ago in Capital Gains
Research, "affiliations by investment advisers with
investment bankers or corporations might be 'an impediment
to a disinterested, objective, or critical attitude toward an
investment by clients."'lg3 Nearly forty years later, sell-side
analyst research reports serve essentially the same function
as buy-side analyst reports and similarly should be free of
conflicts to live up to their firms' representation that the
reports are disinterested.
Any violation of that
representation should give rise to civil liability under section
10(b)of the SEA, regardless of whether the analyst trades on
the market effect of the report because the violation stems
not from post-recommendation trading, but from the lack of
complete disclosure of the conflict of interest. Such liability
is consistent with the primary legislative intent of the SEA
to protect the investor.
Moreover, newly enacted NASD Rule 2711 and amended
NYSE Rule 472, which impose heightened disclosure
obligations on analysts, strengthen an investor's securities
fraud claim in several material respects by providing a clear
industry standard by which violations are measured. First,
the rules firmly establish the materiality of the conflict of
interest. Second, the rules impose a duty t o disclose on all
analysts. Third, the rules ease the burden for a plaintiff t o
prove scienter because analysts would be hard-pressed to
argue that they did not know or appreciate the importance of
complete disclosure of any economic self-interest in their
research. Thus, courts or arbitrators would see the failure to
disclose any conflicts of interest as, at a minimum, reckless,
if not intentionally deceptive.
This deceptive aspect t o the research report is what
pushes the nondisclosure from the merely unfair into the
realm of securities fraud. The Supreme Court plainly holds
that section 10(b) of the SEA "provides a cause of action for
lg3 SEC V. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 187-88
(1963) (quoting Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
Pursuant to Section 30 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,
on Investment Counsel, Investment Management, Investment Advisory
Services, H.R. Doc. No. 477,76th Cong., 2d Sess. 1).
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any plaintiff who 'suffer[s] an injury as a result of deceptive
practices touching its sale [or purchase] of sec~rities.""~~
And the Court itself classified as "deceptive" the failure to
disclose conflicts of interest in Capital Gains Research.lg5
While the securities industry has come a long way in
eliminating deceptive conduct, and the Supreme Court and
Congress have limited the scope of the antifraud provisions
of the SEA, investors are still entitled to honest research
reports free from undisclosed and unfair conflicts of interest.

lg4 Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977) (quoting
Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co, 404 U.S. 6, 12-13
(1971)).
lg5 Id. a t 475 n.15.
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